One of the best ways to defend a DUI charge is to attack the traffic stop by alleging that it was unlawful and in violation of the 4th Amendment to the Constitution.
If the Judge agrees and grants the motion to suppress the traffic stop, then the case is as good as dead.
It is not uncommon during a first meeting with a Florida DUI Lawyer for a prospective DUI Client to have to answer a battery of questions regarding the traffic stop in his case.
These questions can range from "where were the keys?" to "what were the road conditions at the time of the stop?" The DUI Lawyer will want to know if you were driving or parked, awake or asleep, was the car running or off and whether or not the officer blocked you in.
These questions are aimed at a very specific target; the Officer's justification for stopping you.
In 1999, the Second District Court of Appeal for the State of Florida rendered a key opinion regarding DUI and traffic stops in the case of Danielewicz v.
State 730 So.
2d.
363 (2 DCA 1999).
The facts are as follows: At 1:30 am, on July 4, 1997, Officer Robert Wierzba of the Clearwater Florida Police Department pulled into a parking lot of an open restaurant.
There were multiple cars in the parking lot and the Officer later testified that this was a low crime area.
Officer Wierzba saw Danielewicz's car parked in the lot with the headlights on and the engine running.
He later testified that he did not observe any traffic infractions or law violations and that he didn't believe that there were any problems with the vehicle.
He saw that there was condensation on the windows and that Danielewicz was asleep in the driver's seat.
Officer Wierzba ordered her out of the car and ultimately gathered evidence of DUI and arrested her.
Danielewicz's DUI Defense Attorney filed a motion to suppress for unlawful stop.
The Trial Judge denied the motion and stated that it was a lawful investigative stop.
Danielewicz then appealed the ruling to the Second District Court of Appeal for Florida (2nd DCA).
The 2nd DCA stated in its opinion that "in order to justify an investigative stop an Officer must have a well founded suspicion that the subject of the stop is or is about to become involved in criminal activity.
" Danielewicz v.
State, 730 So.
2d.
363 (2 DCA 1999).
The 2nd DCA determined from the facts provided that the Officer did not have a well founded suspicion in this case.
The court went on to say that Danielewicz's conduct could have been interpreted as innocent conduct and that the Officer needed to gain additional evidence to justify a stop.
The State argued that this was an example of a citizen encounter as opposed to an investigative stop.
The 2nd DCA rejected this argument based on the fact that Officer Wierzba ordered her out of the car.
The 2nd DCA reversed the Trial Judge's opinion and the case was ultimately dismissed against Danielewicz.
The Danielewicz case is now regularly cited by DUI Attorneys when attacking traffic stops in court.
Furthermore, the various District Courts as well as the Florida Supreme Court, have cited this case in other rulings regarding investigative stops of all types In 2001 the 2nd DCA held in Shaw v.
State 778 So.
2d.
389 (2 DCA 2001), that an encounter between an officer and a motorist becomes an investigative stop when the Officer orders the suspect out of their vehicle.
The facts of this case presented an interesting twist to Danielewicz because the Officer only asked the suspect to exit his vehicle.
Shaw complied with the request as well as a request to search him and his vehicle.
Contraband was ultimately found.
The 2nd DCA cited Danielewicz stating that the Officer did not have sufficient evidence to warrant an investigative stop.
They went further to say that even though the Officer only requested that Shaw exit the vehicle, the request constituted a "showing of authority" which a reasonable person under the same circumstances would believe that they were required to comply with.
As a result of the suppression of the stop the contraband found was also suppressed under the "fruit of the poisonous tree doctrine.
" I absolutely agree with the findings of the Second District Court of Appeal for Florida in the above discussed cases.
I think all of us should be protected from "fishing expeditions" which are based on a hunch or a profile.
Although many will argue that this makes fighting crime more difficult, their arguments should always be trumped by the Constitution and the rights that it bestows upon us.
If the Judge agrees and grants the motion to suppress the traffic stop, then the case is as good as dead.
It is not uncommon during a first meeting with a Florida DUI Lawyer for a prospective DUI Client to have to answer a battery of questions regarding the traffic stop in his case.
These questions can range from "where were the keys?" to "what were the road conditions at the time of the stop?" The DUI Lawyer will want to know if you were driving or parked, awake or asleep, was the car running or off and whether or not the officer blocked you in.
These questions are aimed at a very specific target; the Officer's justification for stopping you.
In 1999, the Second District Court of Appeal for the State of Florida rendered a key opinion regarding DUI and traffic stops in the case of Danielewicz v.
State 730 So.
2d.
363 (2 DCA 1999).
The facts are as follows: At 1:30 am, on July 4, 1997, Officer Robert Wierzba of the Clearwater Florida Police Department pulled into a parking lot of an open restaurant.
There were multiple cars in the parking lot and the Officer later testified that this was a low crime area.
Officer Wierzba saw Danielewicz's car parked in the lot with the headlights on and the engine running.
He later testified that he did not observe any traffic infractions or law violations and that he didn't believe that there were any problems with the vehicle.
He saw that there was condensation on the windows and that Danielewicz was asleep in the driver's seat.
Officer Wierzba ordered her out of the car and ultimately gathered evidence of DUI and arrested her.
Danielewicz's DUI Defense Attorney filed a motion to suppress for unlawful stop.
The Trial Judge denied the motion and stated that it was a lawful investigative stop.
Danielewicz then appealed the ruling to the Second District Court of Appeal for Florida (2nd DCA).
The 2nd DCA stated in its opinion that "in order to justify an investigative stop an Officer must have a well founded suspicion that the subject of the stop is or is about to become involved in criminal activity.
" Danielewicz v.
State, 730 So.
2d.
363 (2 DCA 1999).
The 2nd DCA determined from the facts provided that the Officer did not have a well founded suspicion in this case.
The court went on to say that Danielewicz's conduct could have been interpreted as innocent conduct and that the Officer needed to gain additional evidence to justify a stop.
The State argued that this was an example of a citizen encounter as opposed to an investigative stop.
The 2nd DCA rejected this argument based on the fact that Officer Wierzba ordered her out of the car.
The 2nd DCA reversed the Trial Judge's opinion and the case was ultimately dismissed against Danielewicz.
The Danielewicz case is now regularly cited by DUI Attorneys when attacking traffic stops in court.
Furthermore, the various District Courts as well as the Florida Supreme Court, have cited this case in other rulings regarding investigative stops of all types In 2001 the 2nd DCA held in Shaw v.
State 778 So.
2d.
389 (2 DCA 2001), that an encounter between an officer and a motorist becomes an investigative stop when the Officer orders the suspect out of their vehicle.
The facts of this case presented an interesting twist to Danielewicz because the Officer only asked the suspect to exit his vehicle.
Shaw complied with the request as well as a request to search him and his vehicle.
Contraband was ultimately found.
The 2nd DCA cited Danielewicz stating that the Officer did not have sufficient evidence to warrant an investigative stop.
They went further to say that even though the Officer only requested that Shaw exit the vehicle, the request constituted a "showing of authority" which a reasonable person under the same circumstances would believe that they were required to comply with.
As a result of the suppression of the stop the contraband found was also suppressed under the "fruit of the poisonous tree doctrine.
" I absolutely agree with the findings of the Second District Court of Appeal for Florida in the above discussed cases.
I think all of us should be protected from "fishing expeditions" which are based on a hunch or a profile.
Although many will argue that this makes fighting crime more difficult, their arguments should always be trumped by the Constitution and the rights that it bestows upon us.
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